IP24090 | Global ambassadors or agents of influence? How the Chinese diaspora fuels Xi Jinping's geopolitical ambitions

SYNOPSIS

The Chinese diaspora strategy under Xi Jinping has become a crucial tool for advancing Beijing's geopolitical ambitions. As China's global influence grows, it has increasingly sought to engage its vast foreign diaspora, not only for economic purposes but also as a key part of its soft power initiatives. Balancing the benefits of diaspora engagement with potential backlash will be a crucial challenge for Beijing.

COMMENT

Chinas diaspora strategy below Xi Jinping has become a crucial tool for advancing Beijing's geopolitical ambitions. As China's global influence grows, it has increasingly sought to engage its vast overseas diaspora, not only for economic purposes, but also as a key part of its development. soft power initiatives. The members of the Chinese diasporapreviously seen primarily as sources of financial and intellectual capital, are now seen as potential public diplomats. By taking advantage of the diaspora, China aims, first and foremost, to build a more positive image abroad and to this end invites the diaspora to tells Chinese history well. Second, Beijing hopes the diaspora will help counter negative perceptions associated with China's growing military and economic influence. Beijing stories of diaspora mobilization use symbolic resources, such as the “one hundred years of humiliation” following the First Opium War and regional ties, to promote pro-regime solidarity among overseas Chinese.

The evolution of the Chinese diaspora strategy

China's approach to engaging its diaspora, known as Qiaowu Gongzuo (overseas Chinese work), has evolved considerably in recent decades. In the early stages of China's reform and opening-up in the late 1970s, the focus was primarily on attracting investment and technological know-how from the diaspora to fuel China's economic growth. China. In the mid-1990s, the Chinese diaspora represented nearly two-thirds of foreign direct investment in China. This economic focus, however, began to change in the early 2000s, when China's growing global ambitions necessitated a more comprehensive approach to managing its overseas communities.

Under Xi Jinping's leadership, the Chinese diaspora has become an integral part of China at large. national strategylinked to the goals of the Chinese dream of national rejuvenation. Xi's administration has increasingly emphasized the role of the diaspora in strengthening China's soft power, projecting a favorable image of China abroad and defending its geopolitical interests. This change is evident in what Lion Suryadinata call him blurring of distinctions between Chinese citizens abroad (Huaqiao) and foreign citizens of Chinese origin (of him) as Beijing seeks to strengthen ties with all individuals of Chinese origin, regardless of their citizenship status.

Soft Power and the Chinese Diaspora

One of the most significant changes in Chinese diaspora policy under Xi has been an increasing emphasis on public diplomacy. The Chinese government now considers the diaspora as public diplomatscapable of shaping the global perception of China and promoting its strategic interests. This view is part of a broader effort to strengthen China's soft power, a concept that encompasses cultural, ideological and diplomatic influence.

Confucius Instituteswhich promote Chinese language and culture, have been one of the most visible manifestations of China's soft power strategy. However, in recent years, Beijing's influence has expanded beyond cultural diplomacy to include more countries. direct political engagement. Diaspora communities are growing in number mobilized participating in social movements, lobbying for China's interests, and even engaging in surveillance activities on behalf of the Chinese state. The integration of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO) into the Chinese Communist Parties (CCP) United Front Work Department (UFWD) in 2018 highlighted the central role that the diaspora now plays in China's global strategy. Certainly, Chinese ethnic associations in Southeast Asia have proactively engaged with China, recognizing the benefits of Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in establishing institutionalized transnational interactions that facilitate cross-border flows of capital, goods, people and information.

Geopolitical ambitions and mobilization of the diaspora

The Chinese diaspora strategy is closely linked to its geopolitical ambitionsparticularly in regions where its interests are contested. In the context of Xinjiang, the Chinese diaspora has mobilized to counter international criticism of Beijing's policies towards Uyghur Muslims. Overseas Chinese associations, often with the support of Chinese diplomatic missions, have made themselves heard defend China's actions in Xinjiang.

THE politicization of Chinese identityhowever, has sparked growing concerns in host countries, particularly in the Global South, where China's efforts to engage its diaspora in supporting its Chinese dream have led to increased suspicion and debate over the role of overseas Chinese in local politics. In some cases, China's use of diaspora communities has stoked ethnic tensions, with these communities seen as agents of Chinese influence, potentially undermining domestic political stability.

The risks of diaspora engagement

While the Chinese diaspora strategy has proven effective in some areas, it also presents significant risks. Coercive measures aimed at controlling and mobilizing the diaspora have raised concerns about the extraterritorial reach of the Chinese state. High-profile cases include the 2015 kidnapping of Swedish bookseller Gui Minhai in Thailand and the 2019 detention of Chinese-Australian writer Yang Hengjun on espionage charges.

In addition to these high-profile cases, there are reports of surveillance of Chinese dissidentsAnd ordinary citizens abroad. Beijing was accused to use its influence over diaspora communities to suppress dissent and ensure that overseas Chinese do not engage in activities perceived as threatening to the CCP's authority. This form of control, often exercised through local Chinese associations or diplomatic missions, has raised concerns about the safety of those who speak out against Chinese policies.

Digital diplomacy and the diaspora

China's efforts to engage its diaspora have also extended to the digital realm, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic. Platforms like WeChat have been used to spread pro-China messages and to mobilize diaspora communities in support of Beijing's management of the crisis. Research has shown that the Chinese government has used WeChat to strengthen transnational nation-building effortsencouraging overseas Chinese to promote China's image and counter negative narratives about its response to the pandemic.

China's digital engagement has been particularly effective in countries with large Chinese populations, where local media and governments have sometimes echoed Beijing's messages. In Italy, for example, the government's favorable attitude towards China during the pandemic was facilitated by the influence Chinese diaspora networks, demonstrating the potential of digital diplomacy to shape global perceptions of China.

Conclusion: a strategy full of tensions

China's diaspora strategy is a key part of its broader geopolitical ambitions, a strategy that is also fraught with tensions and risks. Although the diaspora can be an asset for promoting China's soft power and advancing its international agenda, the coercive measures used to control and mobilize overseas Chinese have raised significant concerns. As China continues to expand its global influence, its diasporic strategy, which consists of direct intimidation of potential critics, propaganda targeting the diaspora, and self-censorship pressures regarding discussions of Chinese affairs, is likely. to play an increasingly important role in its foreign policy. . However, balancing the benefits of diaspora engagement with the potential for backlash will pose a crucial challenge for Beijing.

Stephanie Kam is an Assistant Professor in the China Program and Coordinator of the Master's Program in Asian Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS).