Understanding Prabowos Natunas’ bet with China

China and Indonesia acknowledge they have overlapping claims in the South China Sea. However, this should not be interpreted as recognition by Indonesia of the legitimacy of the nine-dash line. Mutual recognition of disputes by both parties does not automatically give credence to the other party's claim. Likewise, simply denying the existence of a dispute does not deny its reality. As noted by the International Court of Justice in the case Interpretation of peace treaties case: The question of whether an international dispute exists must be determined objectively. These legal principles are essential to understanding the dynamics between Indonesia and China and the significance of their recent conflicts. Joint declarations 2024t during President Prabowo Subiantos' visit to Beijing on November 9.

A few reviews argue that Indonesia has ceded to China, recognized the nine-dash line, or demanded that Prabowo refrain from carrying out the declaration by establishing bilateral cooperation to manage disputes. But acknowledging the existence of differences does not mean that Indonesia is giving in to Beijing, but recognizes a natural progression in response to China's assertive stance. Indonesia's acknowledgment of disputes with China in the joint statement simply acknowledges the reality that disputes already existed because both sides have used legal arguments against each other since mid-2016.

As the lawyer Christopher Schreuer has already said observedIt takes very little for the parties to express opposing positions to establish a dispute. In particular, the denial of the existence of a dispute by a party will serve no purpose. Therefore, Indonesia's options are limited to shaping domestic discourse around these disputes, rather than preventing their existence. This should not necessarily be seen as a surrender to China.

Nevertheless, this joint declaration is remarkable, even if its meaning must be put into perspective.

Although Indonesian policymakers have already floated ideas for joint cooperation in the Natunas with China, including Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa in 2014 and the Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs, Luhut Panjaitan, to 2016this is the first time that such an intention has been formalized in writing. This departs from Indonesia's long-standing policy of denying disagreements over whether China's nine-dash line intersects Indonesia's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Natunas.

As Indonesia and China began to present legal arguments against each other, with China relying on historical claims and Indonesia invoking UNCLOS, this marked the start of a formal dispute on fishing rights.

Since 1995, following the visit to Beijing by Ali Alata, then Indonesian foreign minister, Jakarta and Beijing have long maintained that no dispute existed, thereby downplaying any potential disagreement. Even in March 2016, when Chinese coast guard vessels intervened as Indonesia attempted to seize a Chinese fishing boat, Kway Feycaptured in the Natuna EEZ, said Hua Chunying, a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry. rejected the incident, reiterating that Indonesia has no territorial claim to China's Nansha Islands, and that China fully agrees that the Natuna Islands belong to Indonesia.

But a change occurred in the months that followed. For the first time, in response to a subsequent standoff between the Indonesian navy and two CCG vessels that attempted to prevent the arrest of a Chinese fishing boat, China employee a legal argument against Indonesia: this happened in waters that are Chinese fishermen traditional fishing grounds and where China and Indonesia have overlapping claims to maritime rights and interests. (emphasis added) China had used such a legal argument against other parties in the South China Sea, but not against Indonesia.

Indonesia responded by citing the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, arguing that traditional fishing zones are not legally permitted. recognized. As Indonesia and China began to present legal arguments against each other, with China relying on historical claims and Indonesia invoking UNCLOS, this marked the start of a formal dispute on fishing rights.

By 2021, Chinese fishing activities and law enforcement encroachments in the Natunas had become frequent. In response, Indonesia inaugurated a new military unit in the Natunas in 2019, conducted large-scale military exercises in 2020 and 2021, and intensified defense diplomacy with the United States, focusing on border defense. In this context, China sent a diplomatic note in August 2021, demanding that Jakarta cease operations in the Tuna block. China's denial of Indonesia's right to drill for gas on its continental shelf marked an expansion of its claim from traditional fishing grounds to broader maritime jurisdiction.

By this point, based on my fieldwork in Jakarta in early 2022, key factions within Jokowi's administration had come to view that denying differences was no longer viable – a perspective that has persisted in the Prabowos administration.

Interviews with stakeholders in 2022 revealed that Jokowi's administration was exploring alternative approaches, including those now adopted by Prabowo, and concluded that a tacit agreement it was better to allow both sides to coexist in disputed regions. Prabowo obviously went further, offering to acknowledge the existence of overlapping claims with Beijing in exchange for Beijing's support for Indonesia's own domestic and geopolitical policies. goalsparticularly with regard to its ambition to be part of the global electric vehicle value chain.

Acknowledging disputes, as Prabowo has done, creates new opportunities either to aggressively challenge Beijing's nine-dash line in an international court, as the Philippines has done in the past, or to manage tensions while putting disputes aside. Jakarta and Beijing have favored the latter approach since the publication of the joint declaration.

Jakarta may continue to deny being a claimant in the South China Sea disputes, as it does not claim any features of the Spratlys or Paracels. However, by recognizing disputes, it could work with other Southeast Asian claimants to influence their resolution, whether through lengthy negotiations on a code of conduct or other mechanisms.

The question remains: Can Prabowo consolidate the supposed benefits of Beijing's formal recognition of these disputes?