Xi’s new US-China formula demonstrates assured change of terms

One of the most notable outcomes of last month’s Xi-Trump summit in Beijing was not tangible. Rather, it was Xi Jinping’s introduction of a new power formulationOr tifǎ, for US-China relations.

Such authoritative concepts have long been an important element means for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to convey the priorities, strategic assessments, historical judgments and policy programs of the top leader or collective leadership at a given time.

Historically, tifǎ were also important indicators changing ideological and political terrain, and as means to senior leaders to define and build their political programs.

This has certainly continued to be the case under Xi’s leadership, where measures have been enacted in all manner of policy areas, ranging from foreign policy has ethnic minority policy.

What then does it mean for Xi to promulgate “constructive strategic stability” as the new guiding language for US-China relations?

As reported According to China’s official Xinhua newspaper, the formulation is defined as having four levels: “positive stability with cooperation as the pillar”, “stability with moderate competition”, “stability with manageable differences” and “lasting stability with promises of peace”.

In a later press briefing, Foreign Minister Wang Yi provided more details on each of them.

“Positive stability with cooperation as the pillar”, Wang suggestedshould be the basic condition of bilateral relations, reflecting the deep economic interdependence between the two countries where “neither can exclude the other, nor prosper without the other”.

“Stability with moderate competition” in turn indicates Beijing’s preference for establishing safeguards for ensure that “competition is kept within appropriate limits and does not turn into a zero-sum game.”

Wang then gave a clear indication of what these “appropriate limits” might be by affirming that the “essential” is that both sides must “respect each other’s social systems and development paths, respect each other’s fundamental interests and major concerns, and respect everyone’s right to development.”

Only if this “bottom line” is respected can bilateral relations achieve the overarching goal of “lasting stability”.

This formulation is significant for at least two reasons. First, it demonstrates that if Beijing clearly considers relations between the United States and China to be “competitive”, it now wishes to make it a limited or regulated competition.

This contrasts with China’s position on the issue of safeguards during much of the Biden administration’s tenure, where it was the US side that appeared to have more interest in establishing them. Then, the Chinese position was illuminated by a perception that the United States was a power in decline and that, as Xi said declared in March 2021, “time is on our side”.

With Trump’s return to the White House, China’s perception of the decline of the United States has not changed but has instead been reinforced by a see that the United States is now more willing to “use war, conquest, and the threat of war” to “compensate for America’s declining economic competitiveness.”

This, as Vice Dean of the School of International Studies of Renmin University, Jin Canrong, arguesmeans that “America’s current harshness and arrogance do not reflect a real rise in power” but rather demonstrate the acceleration of its decline through the “self-depletion” of its military, economic and diplomatic resources.

In this context, as Foreign Minister Wang formula safeguards are now needed to ensure that “the relationship does not feel like a roller coaster”.

Second, and more importantly, the new language presents China as a peer and equal to the United States in its contribution to international order and stability.

“A Positive Perspective of Sino-US Cooperation”, Wang argued“will bring more certainty for the development of the two countries and for the international situation”. As such, “constructive strategic stability” should “be a goal that both sides champion.”

The implication here, like Zongyuan Zoe Liu Remarksis that “the United States should respect China’s core interests, refrain from defining their relationship primarily as strategic competition, and manage disputes within limits acceptable to Beijing.”

The Trump administration is obvious acceptance This phraseology – if not its substance – will therefore undoubtedly be considered by Beijing as a victory in its desire to establish the “appropriate limits” of the American-Chinese rivalry on its terms.

Dr Michael Clarke is Associate Professor of International Politics and Strategy at the Center for Future Defense and National Security at Deakin University, and Adjunct Associate Professor at the Institute of Australia-China Relations at the University of Technology Sydney.