Why Turkey and Azerbaijan are arguing

Once considered inseparable, Baku and Ankara are increasingly at odds over their respective ties to Armenia and Israel.

For decades, the slogan “one nation, two states” has defined Turkish-Azerbaijani relations. He spoke of ethnic brotherhood, energy interdependence and a military alliance – most recently during the Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020. But behind the pan-Turkish rhetoric, fault lines appear on the questions of Armenian normalization, Israel and Iran.

The latest hot spot: Azerbaijan’s ambassador to Ankara recently declared that the border between Turkey and Armenia will be opened after the Armenian elections in June, once constitutional amendments have been made. Baku has long demanded that Armenia amend its constitution to erase any lingering claims to Nagorno-Karabakh. If outgoing Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s party wins the election, it is expected to move forward by putting these changes to a referendum.

What is striking here is a foreign ambassador publicly announcing the timetable and conditions of Turkey’s sovereign border policy. This demand illustrates the trend identified by Gonul Tol of the Washington-based Middle East Institute. Over the past year, There are more and more Turkish diplomats complained about how “difficult” Azerbaijan has become, especially when Baku tries to dictate terms to Ankara.

The ambassador’s public statement takes things to a new level. As former diplomat Fatih Ceylan said note“At a time when Ankara carefully avoids statements targeting Baku on Azerbaijan’s strategic military ties with Israel, the Azerbaijani ambassador’s comment on normalization between Turkey and Armenia is unfortunate to say the least. More precisely, it is a case of not knowing where one’s place is,” Ceylan said, expecting the Foreign Ministry to issue “a stern reprimand soon.”

The reprimand never came, but the friction was real. It feels like 2009 all over again, when Turkey and Armenia signed the Zurich Protocols to normalize relations, but Azerbaijan then implemented them. political and diplomatic pressure– forcing Ankara to back down. Azerbaijani media attacked to Ankara’s envoy to Armenia, Serdar Kilic, for daring to say that he “felt at home” during a recent visit to Yerevan. A pro-government analyst, Farhad Mammadov, attacked him for allegedly “ignoring Baku’s red lines.”

But 2009 is not 2026. Today, Turkey has less incentive to rely on Baku. The Nagorno-Karabakh war is over; Azerbaijan achieved its territorial goals with the help of Turkey. Ankara’s strategic calculus has changed: détente with Armenia could reduce Russian influence in the South Caucasus, open a direct trade route to Central Asia, and improve Turkey’s position with the West.

A deeper fissure is emerging over Israel. Baku and Jerusalem have quietly built one of the strongest military and intelligence partnerships in the post-Soviet space. Israeli drones and errant munitions played a decisive role in breaking Armenia’s defenses in 2020. Today, Israeli weapons represent almost 70 percent imports of advanced weapons from Azerbaijan. In exchange, Baku provides Israel about 40 percent of its crude oil– a lifeline for a country engaged in a permanent war with its neighbors.

But here’s the growing problem for Baku: Israel and its supporters in Washington are increasingly portraying Turkey as the “new Iran.” Opposition Leader Naftali Bennett sounded the alarm on the “emerging Turkish threat”. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu accused Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has oppressed the Kurds, violating Ankara’s reddest of red lines.

Israeli politicians and officials now compare Ankara’s regional ambitions – its military bases in Qatar and Somalia, its ties to the post-Assad Syrian regime and the leadership of Hamas – are linked to Iran’s Islamist revolutionary export model.

Even more striking, pro-Israel and hawkish think tanks in Washington, such as the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), have begun to replicate the same rhetorical framework they have been applied to Iran for decades and are now targeting Turkey. Turkey is considered a “Islamist“regime that is developing long-range missile programs And destabilize NATO from the inside. Rhetoric once reserved for the Islamic Republic is now routine rhetoric against a NATO ally.

What the FDD calls an “Islamist threat” coming from Türkiye actually resonates with part of Baku’s resolutely secular establishment. In elite circles, there is a certain cultural disdain for Erdogan’s visible piety. While Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev is largely a product of the Soviet education system, Erdoğan has built his career on Islamist roots, from his early days as mayor of Istanbul to his rhetorical embrace of Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. And Aliyev certainly never compared Israeli leaders to Adolf Hitler, as Erdogan has.

For years, the two men successfully managed this cultural and political divide, focusing on common Turkish identity, security and economic interdependence. But the success of the Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020 has bred pride in Baku. Aliyev no longer sees himself as a junior partner seeking protection from Ankara. He sees himself as the regional winnerand he hopes Turkey will follow suit. This attitude grids on Turkish officials, who are remembered for providing the drones, military advisers and diplomatic cover that made this victory possible.

Israel’s war against Iran has further highlighted the divergent perspectives. Tehran suspects Baku of covertly helping Israel by allowing it to use its airspace for strikes against Iran in June 2025. When drones of Iranian origin landed in Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan region in March 2026, hitting the airport and injuring four civilians, Aliyev called it “ “act of terror» and promised retaliation.

However, the incident was quickly downplayed and Aliyev sent humanitarian aid to Iran for Nawruz, the Persian New Year widely celebrated in both countries.

According to Altai Goyushov According to the Baku Research Institute, an independent think tank, this turnaround is, at least in part, the result of Turkey’s quiet pressure on Aliyev to de-escalate the situation. While Azerbaijan sees strategic advantage in strengthening its position in Iran’s Azerbaijani regions, for Turkey, any plan to partition Iran along ethnic lines is anathema, as it fears such an endeavor would fuel Kurdish separatism.

Israel, on the other hand, offers Azerbaijan diplomatic room to maneuver, including valuable ties with Washington. This is particularly valuable as Baku seeks to permanent repeal of Section 907 of the Freedom Act, passed in the early 1990s, which prohibits Azerbaijan from receiving direct American military support.

So, what would happen if Israel and Turkey came to face each other directly? On the current trajectory, Baku may have to choose between Ankara and Jerusalem at some point. But for now, neither Ankara nor Baku has any interest in imposing this dilemma.

The bonds that unite remain formidable. Azerbaijan is linked to Turkey by Choucha Declaration— a mutual defense pact. The Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline (TANAP) and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline make Turkey an indispensable transit hub for Azerbaijani energy to Europe. Military cooperation continues. Turkey provides Azerbaijan with diplomatic cover against Iran and Russia.

But the cracks are real. “One nation, two states” has always been an ambitious, unconstitutional goal. When one state attempts to dictate the other’s borders and maintain a secret alliance with the other’s declared adversary, the fiction becomes strained. Not yet broken, but no longer effortless.

About the author: Eldar Mamedov

Eldar Mamedov is a foreign policy expert based in Brussels. Since 2009, Mamedov has been a political advisor to the Social Democrats in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament (EP) and is responsible for the interparliamentary relations of the EP delegations with Iran, Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula. He worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia and as a diplomat in the Latvian embassies in Washington and Madrid. He graduated from the University of Latvia and the Diplomatic School in Madrid, Spain.