Multi-pronged peace offensive pushes Putin into a corner

Executive summary:

• Moscow is projecting confidence with its continued offensive in Ukraine, but the Kremlin is concerned about growing international efforts for peace talks and growing discontent at home.
• Turkish President Tayyip Recep Erdogan is taking steps to engage in peace talks this summer, while China has avoided announcing whether it will send a delegation to Turkey. Swiss.
• The Kremlin tries to focus on positive news, but struggles to mask the growing discontent in Russian society as infrastructure crumbles, concerns about Islamist extremism grow and a potential new wave of mobilization looms. .

---

Against all strategic logic, Russian troops continue to push Ukrainian defenses beyond Avdiivka and Bakhmut, paying a heavy price in losses for every centimeter gained. The main reason for these self-destructive attacks is to maintain the initiative necessary to prove Russia's advantage in this long war. This illusion of control gives Russian President Vladimir Putin the confidence to assert that all of his original goals regarding the special military operation, namely the dismantling of Ukraine and the innervation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), will be achieved. At the same time, he considers it necessary to declare his readiness to end the war, a point he mentioned last week during a meeting with the Belarusian president and Putin ally. Alexander Lukashenka (Kommersant, April 12). Growing international calls for peace talks have left the Kremlin leader in a bind, as Moscow appears unable to provide effective solutions to ease domestic conflicts and achieve victory in Ukraine.

Putin's long reflections on the peace agreement almost concluded in March 2022 in Istanbul barely manage to camouflage his unalterable ultimatum that Ukraine can only end the war by capitulating (RBC.ru, April 11). He was prompted to declare his readiness to resume negotiations because of the confirmation of a mid-June conference in Switzerland, where officials will discuss the peace plan proposed by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky (Gazeta Rossiyskaya, April 12). Serious multilateral efforts have been invested in this event, which could yield more results than the three previous conferences in Malta, Jeddah and Copenhagen (Moscow time, April 10). Moscow has good reason to fear that Switzerland will achieve stronger Western unity and broader support in the Global South (see GEDApril 8) . As a result, Moscow has tried to argue that no agreement can be reached without its participation, while asserting that it does not intend to take part in the conference (TASSApril 12; IzvestiaApril 13).

A particular concern is Trkiyes participation in the conference (RIA-Novosti, April 11). Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has the ambition to become a key mediator, even a peacemaker, between kyiv and Moscow. Zelensky's visit to Istanbul last month aimed to encourage these aspirations while promoting military-technical cooperation (NV.ua, April 12). The new edition of Erdogan's peace initiative, published last week, is far from Zelensky's formula. However, Trkiyes' engagement with the Swiss conference will not constitute a small diplomatic victory for Ukraine (New Gazeta Europe, April 12). Putin's visit to Türkiye has been postponed, according to the Kremlin, for the foreseeable future. Ankara's recent preference for deepening ties with the United States and supporting a greater role for NATO does not match Moscow's hopes of cultivating a closer partnership (InterfaxApril 8).

The Kremlin appears more concerned about Beijing's position on ending the war. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov traveled to Beijing last week to meet his counterpart Wang Yi and Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping (RIAC, April 11). Lavrov found it much easier to jointly condemn NATO activity in the Asia-Pacific region than to determine whether China would send a delegation to Switzerland, a challenge that did not stop the Russian official from asserting that the Zelensky's formula and Beijing's peace plan were incompatible (TASS, April 12). China continues to play a complex game of war profiteering, showing itself willing to increase its support for Russia while feigning compliance with the Western sanctions regime (Forbes.ruMarch 21st).

The Russian population's lack of enthusiasm for the war effort further upset Moscow. As unreliable as opinion polls are in Russia, recent polls show that in the 1824 age group, only 22 percent support continued combat operations; 59 percent prefer peace talks. Only half of respondents in the 55+ age group agree with the Kremlin's war propaganda (Levada.ru, April 4). Natural disasters, such as the catastrophic floods in the Orenburg region, are creating more public resentment over Moscow's colossal spending on the war. At the same time, critical infrastructure, such as dams and bridges, remains largely underfunded (Moscow timeApril 9).

Putin chose, as usual, to distance himself from the bad news, focusing instead on the successful (if long-delayed) launch of the new Angara-A5 space rocket from the Vostochny cosmodrome (Svoboda.org, April 12; see EDM, April 15). However, this achievement can do little to boost public morale, particularly because Russia's leadership in space has been reduced to Gagarin-era legends and new Roscosmos projects remain seriously underfunded (GEDFebruary 23; Independent newspaperApril 11).

Growing anti-war sentiments in Russian society may encourage many military-age men to dodge the current spring conscription and abandon dwindling battalions in Ukraine, exhausted by trench warfare (CurrentTime.tv, April 13). They also accentuate the political risks of a new wave of mobilization which is looming (The insider, April 12). Plans for a new summer offensive require an increase in troops, but the Russian economy is already significantly slowed by a severe labor shortage (Svoboda.org, April 9). This limbo contrasts with Ukraine, which adopted a new mobilization law last week (Re: Russia, April 8). The law is controversial and its adoption was rather difficult. Russian propaganda tried to highlight these facts as signs of Ukraine's weakness (GED, April 10). In reality, these disagreements demonstrate the resilience of democratic processes, even in times of war (IzvestiaApril 12).

A new anti-war engine has emerged in Russia after the terrorist attack on Crocus City Hall, which highlighted the growing threat of Islamist extremism (Jellyfish, April 3). Military-patriotic experts are eager to continue the false Ukrainian connection while demanding tough measures against migrant workers from Central Asia (TopWar.ru, April 10). Putin's assurances that Russia cannot be the target of attacks by Islamist fundamentalists are hardly convincing, especially as the Middle East is gripped by violence (RBC.ru, April 4). The close military partnership between the Kremlin and Iran prevented Moscow from uttering a word of criticism against the attack on Israel on April 14, in which some 185 errant Shahed-136 munitions (the same drones Russia uses against Ukraine) were shot down (RIA NovostiApril 14).

Putin may be harboring the illusion that he is winning the long war against Ukraine. In reality, the Kremlin is losing as traumatized Russian society faces continued degradation and international actors increasingly unite to demand an end to hostilities. Peace plans and initiatives may diverge and differ in terms of feasibility and legal integrity, but none are acceptable to Putin, who has linked the survival of his corrupt regime to perpetual war. The idea of ​​peace, however, is gaining momentum and ultimately seeks to overcome the warlike madness of the Kremlin leaders.