Charity please? China knocks on Indonesia's door

China tests the new administration of Prabowo Subiantos, with three successive mandates raids by Chinese Coast Guard vessels in Indonesia's exclusive maritime jurisdiction, the first time on the day of the new president's inauguration.

Jakarta urgently needs to recalibrate its diplomacy in the South China Sea and review its basic assumptions towards China. China's move south should also be a wake-up call to Canberra that its quest for so-called bilateral stabilization with Beijing is unrelated to China's strategic intentions.

These forays are more than a test of Prabowo's courage. They constitute tangible evidence that the economy-focused, neutrality-driven approach of Prabowo's predecessor, Joko Widodo, fundamentally failed to temper China's maritime expansionism in the southernmost regions of the Sea. Southern China. China makes clear to Prabowo that it still claims ownership of all seabed waters and resources under the dotted line claim, including part of Indonesia's continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) around of the Natuna Islands.

This is despite Jakarta's long-standing official position that there is no conflict of jurisdiction with China, given the legally baseless nature of China's claim over the scope of this case. However, under Prabowo, Indonesian maritime authorities appear to be implementing greater transparency over Chinese activities near the Natuna Islands, quickly releasing video and audio of challenges by the Chinese coast guard to Indonesian vessels in the area .

If Jakarta thought it had achieved a diplomatic modus vivendi with Beijing despite their differences in the South China Sea, Chinese leaders clearly have other ideas. A prominent Indonesian analyst has argued that relations between the Philippines and China deteriorated because Manila's diplomacy was not in line with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) holistic and non-confrontational approach to towards Beijing. In fact, Chinese incursions near the Natuna Islands should prompt Jakarta to question its own diplomatic stances toward China, ASEAN, and the South China Sea. By failing to diplomatically support the Philippines, the previous Indonesian administration only emboldened China's divide-and-rule tactics, now found at Indonesia's sea gates.

Under Widodo, Jakarta has prioritized economic benefits in its dealings with Beijing, helping to make China Indonesia's largest source of foreign investment. Indonesia has remained party to intractable negotiations between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations over a code of conduct in the South China Sea. But it failed to invest any real energy in the effort, with the result that the process drifted aimlessly from one ASEAN Chairmanship to the next, weakening the organization's collective resolve.

Indonesia must now, belatedly, put its full weight behind these negotiations, either to achieve a meaningful outcome or to end the negotiations if Beijing continues to stagnate. Jakarta, meanwhile, is expected to rally diplomatic support in Southeast Asia for the Philippines, another founding ASEAN member facing a clear external threat, as Indonesia did for Thailand in the 1980s. Southeast Asia's collective security must come before the economic benefits of individual members, in line with ASEAN's founding spirit and diplomatic objective.

China unfortunately received the message that Southeast Asia can easily be divided by working bilaterally and exploiting its greater weight relative to any of the countries. Malaysia's pleading stance toward China under Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has only stoked Beijing's confidence in its ability to divide and rule ASEAN with ease.

One of China's follow-up goals is to persuade Indonesia that it should properly manage maritime issuesbased on broader factors in their relationship. Jakarta should be alert to China's bad faith intentions, including offers for dialogue, and redouble its efforts in the code of conduct negotiations. In doing so, it would return to its traditional leadership role within ASEAN.

Indonesia must openly support the Philippines and Vietnam every time they face Chinese aggression in the South China Sea. Jakarta should prioritize efforts to reach an agreement on the EEZ border with Vietnam, building on the successful demarcation of Indonesia's maritime border with the Philippines. This will make it more difficult for Beijing to exploit differences between Southeast Asian coastal states. Prabowos' decision to send military assets to help the Philippines under a quadrinational agreement ASEAN Disaster Relief Mission was a laudable signal of solidarity and goodwill.

China may rightly feel that Southeast Asia overall is in a state of flux and that the Philippines appears isolated within ASEAN. But poking Indonesia is never a recommended strategy. By acting in this authoritarian manner, China reveals its pride.

Prabowo He may be a changeable figure, but he's unlikely to be a pushover. An axis of cooperation between Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam could further hinder Beijing's path to dominance in the South China Sea. But Jakarta must draw its own clear-eyed conclusions about China's strategic intent from first principles.

Australia should take note. Beijing's direct challenge to Indonesia's maritime sovereign rights, despite years of favorable treatment from Widodo, calls into question the meaning of what Canberra calls stabilization with China.

Beijing's strategic behavior continues to be profoundly hostile to Australia's security in the immediate region. China is gradually moving south, while the Australian government seems obsessed with lobsters And wine exports.