The dangers of a Turkish-Syrian rapprochement

Since Turkey and Syria severed relations in 2011, Ankara has played a leading role in the fight against Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria, providing material support to insurgent groups seeking to overthrow Assad and maintaining forces in the opposition-held northwest of the country. However, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Assad have recently expressed interest in restoring diplomatic relations.

Meeting proposed between Erdogan and Assad

At the NATO summit on July 11, Erdogan said that he would extend an official invitation to Assad either to come to Turkey or to meet in a third country. This overture was made after the Syrian leader said Damascus has declared itself open to the revival of Turkish-Syrian relations on condition that they are based on respect for the sovereignty of the Syrian state over its entire territory and on the fight against all forms of terrorism.

Sources familiar with the talks said the meeting could take place as early as August in Moscow, with Russian President Vladimir Putin as the mediator. However, Turkish diplomats have publicly stated that there is no official plan.

Reluctance on both sides

Recent developments, including Syria's readmission to the Arab League, have paved the way for a rapprochement between the two former allies. Erdogan is likely responding in part to the increased tensions between the two countries. anti-syrian A sentiment that has led to riots and xenophobic violence in Turkey. As fears mount over Erdogan's re-election prospects in 2028, the government in Ankara has greater incentive to strike a deal with Assad to pave the way for the return of many 3.6 million Syrian refugees living in Türkiye.

Assad has already stated that the precondition for any negotiations with Turkey is the complete withdrawal of Ankara’s support for opposition militias and the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Syria. However, the Syrian president is also motivated by his desire to end his regional political isolation. Assad is likely aware that a meeting with Erdogan would likely not result in a complete withdrawal, as Ankara continues to cite its support for opposition forces as necessary to ensure a terrorism-free northern Syria, where Turkish forces could be deployed. cross-border attacks Attacks by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) have taken place.

While the likelihood of concessions on either side is unclear, the possibility of this meeting indicates some willingness to find common ground that would benefit the power projection and legitimacy of both leaders. Ankara and Damascus both have an interest in limiting the autonomy of Kurdish groups in northeast Syria, which could be a driving force in negotiations. Both governments could also seek economic gains by removing obstacles to the flow of official trade.

Who is threatened by a rapprochement?

While both Erdogan and Assad are considering restoring ties based on their personal interests,

ambitions, there are serious risks involved. In some areas of Syria where Turkish-backed militias retain control, protesters Turkish authorities have already expressed concern over reports that a key border crossing between Assad-held territory and opposition-held cities will soon be reopened to commercial traffic. Violent attacks on Turkish military and supply trucks by opposition groups reflect growing fears about the impact that the new relationship between Ankara and Damascus could have on their ability to defend themselves. Turkey itself may be particularly vulnerable to this resentment, as many of these militias are affiliated with jihadist movements, have Turkish residency or citizenship, and have shown a willingness to retaliate violently.

The Syrian Kurds are likely the biggest losers from the normalization of relations between Erdogan and Assad. United under the banner of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the United States has joined forces with the SDF forces to with success counter the existential threat posed by the Islamic State (ISIS).

Since the beginning of the US-SDF partnership, Turkey has feigned outrage, accusing Washington of partnering with Kurdish terrorists. Ankara identifies the SDF as an offshoot of the Kurdish separatist movement in Turkey, led by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). While the SDF has organic ties to the PKK, which has historically waged a bloody cessation of hostilities campaign against Turkey, the Syrian branch has made clear, through its words and actions, that it harbors no ill will toward Turkey. The group’s primary goal has been to defeat ISIS.

A region onLThis According to Erdogan, a rapprochement between Assad and Erdogan could depend on a joint Syrian-Turkish military offensive to rout the SDF. This would allow Turkey to eliminate the alleged Kurdish threat, while Assad would regain regime control over Syrian territory. All of this is hypothetical for now, as Ankara and Damascus are likely waiting to see the outcome of the US elections. Erdogan’s desired outcome would be a second Trump administration, which he believes he can convince to withdraw US troops, paving the way for a military offensive against the SDF.

A withdrawal of US forces would, however, carry significant risks, and not just for the Kurds. There are reports of a significant resurgence of ISIS in the region. And without the SDF aided by the US military, it is not impossible that another significant ISIS threat could re-emerge.

All of this could mean an unwanted victory for Russia and Iran. Their investment in the Assad regime will have paid off if the latter can successfully reintegrate into the region. A US exit from Syria would also be a blatant recognition of the weakening of American influence in the Middle East and would stand in direct contrast to a Syrian regime with a consolidated alliance with two major American rivals.

Sophia Epley is a student at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. Sinan Ciddi is a nonresident senior fellow on Turkey at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.