Corruption and purge within the PLA: apprehension and distrust

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On November 28, 2024, reports have emerged that Admiral Miao Hua, a senior officer in China's Central Military Commission (CMC), had been arrested for disciplinary violations, a euphemism for corruption charges. Admiral Miao is the fourth high-ranking general to be involved in President Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign. Earlier this year, former Defense Ministers Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe were sued, and even current Defense Minister Admiral Dong Jun was reportedly prosecuted. under investigation for corruption. Li Shangfu only served seven months before his dismissal, while Dong Jun appears unlikely to complete his eleventh month.^th months in power. This rapid change, accompanied by arrests and prosecutions for corruption, highlights a deep unease and internal power struggle within the People's Liberation Army (PLA). These developments raise serious concerns about the PLA's combat capability, Xi's confidence in the military, and the broader implications for China's security and foreign policy.

This rapid change, accompanied by arrests and prosecutions for corruption, highlights a deep unease and internal power struggle within the People's Liberation Army (PLA).

The DNA of corruption

Corruption within the PLA is deeply structural, rooted in the centuries-old Chinese philosophy that the military should be self-reliant and contribute to the economy. So the PLA grew its food, raised its animals, made its uniforms, and by the 1980s controlled 656,000 acres of farmland, producing 500,000 tons of grain, 650,000 tons of vegetables, and 104,000 tons of meat per year. .^[1]

Deng Xiaoping, during his reforms from 1978 to 1980, significantly reduced the defense budget. Then, in 1985, the General Department of Logistics (GLD), under the leadership of Deng, empowered PLA units to launch small, medium and large-scale businesses with start-up capital offered in the form of ready wherever necessary. This policy led the four departments and general services of the PLA to establish large companies, including Poly Group, Kaili Corporation, Xinxing Corporation and China United Airlines. Many of these companies were run by princelings (descendants of senior party officials), with Deng's daughter apparently having a substantial interest in Poly Group. These companies were nominally taxed at 10%, but their significant profits were diverted to offshore accounts, thereby promoting systemic corruption. This nexus between China's political leadership and the upper echelons of the PLA has established a cycle of mutual dependence and pervasive corruption.

Over the years, various PLA units have expanded their economic activities to various sectors, including hotels, construction and hospitals. The most adventurous have even taken a liking to managing prostitution rings, racketeering and other criminal enterprises. The military's control over armed power has provided sufficient protection for these illegal activities, leading to widespread corruption, profiteering, smuggling, speculation, illegitimate sales and purchases. These practices have infiltrated the core operation of the PLA, manifesting in the buying and selling of promotions, moonlighting, use of surrogates, falsification of training reports, and diversion of military resources to commercial purposes such as the illegal sale of oil for tanks and artillery.^[2]

In 1985, the General Department of Logistics (GLD), under Deng's instruction, empowered PLA units to launch small, medium and large-scale businesses with start-up capital offered in the form of ready wherever it was needed.

In response, Chinese leaders introduced restrictions on PLA commercial activities in 1993 and 1995, culminating in a total ban in 1998-99.^[3] However, the effectiveness of the ban remains questionable, as entrenched corruption persists within the PLA. In 2015, retired PLA Generals Revealed that almost every rank in the PLA had a price and that all crucial positions were reserved for cronies, often princes. Corruption was endemic and amounts often reached millions. For example, a general reportedly paid $2.75 million to former Vice President Xu Caihou to secure his promotion. Such corruption has significantly undermined the professionalism of the PLA.

Hunting tigers and flies

As president of China, Xi Jinping has made the fight against corruption a cornerstone of his governance plan. contagious tigers and flies The campaign has gained considerable momentum within the PLA in recent years. In the past year alone, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) has ensnared nine PLA generals, including four leaders and several members of the CMC. Additionally, senior executives in the defense industry have been fired and arrested. For example, Tan Ruisongthe former chairman of the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), was recently fired for corruption. It was accused of compromising quality by using substandard materials and outsourcing manufacturing to temporary workers, leading to defective and potentially dangerous components.

A small list of senior military officers prosecuted as part of this campaign is detailed in Table 1.

Table 1: Senior PLA officials prosecuted for corruption

Year	Name	Rank	Designation
November 2024	Miao Hua	Admiral	Member of the CMC
November 2024	Dong Jun	Admiral	Minister of Defense
August 2023	Li Shangfu	General	Minister of Defense
August 2023	Li Yuchao	General	Commander of the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF)
August 2023	Liu Guangbin	General	Dy Commander, PLARF
August 2023	Xu Zhongbo	General	Political Commissioner, PLARF
August 2023	Rao Wenmin	General	Equipment Development Department
August 2023	Xia Qingyue	General	Equipment Development Department
August 2023	Wang Dazhong	Admiral	Equipment Development Department
August 2023	Zhang Zhenzhong	General	Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff Department of the CMC
August 2023	Zhang Fusheng	General	PLA Rocket Force
August 2023	Wu Guohua	General	Dy Commander, PLARF (Suicide)
August 2023	Ju Gansheng	General	PLA Rocket Force
August 2023	Shang Hong	General	PLA Rocket Force
March 2023	Wei Fenghe	General	Minister of Defense
June 2014	Xu Caihou	General	Vice President, CMC (deceased)
July 2015	Guo Boxing	General	Member of the CMC
April 2014	Gu Junshan	General	Chefs Dy, GLD

Source: The authors own

Admiral Purge of Miao Hua appears to stem from his alleged involvement in the sale of promotions during his tenure as head of the Political Work Department which oversees all PLA promotions. Similarly, Admiral Dong Jun faces prosecution for his role in the Equipment Development Department, a hotbed of corruption within the PLA.

However, among these sweeping purges, Xi notably refrained from targeting his second-in-command at the CMC, General Zhang Youxia, the longtime head of the Equipment Development Department and the General Armaments Department. As the son of General Zhang Zhongxun, a prominent Communist general who fought in both the Anti-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War, Zhang shares deep family ties with Xi. Their fathers served together in the First Field Army, and Zhang and Xi are princes from the same province. Zhang is also one of the few PLA officers with combat experience. All these factors ensure its protection. Xi may prefer to wait and allow Zhang to finish his term peacefully.

Lack of confidence at all levels

Corruption and organizational malaise within the PLA can erode trust between junior officers, soldiers and their superiors, many of whom obtained their positions through money, connections or hereditary privilege. This distrust can seriously undermine morale and raise suspicions about the willingness of ordinary citizens to die for this corrupt cohort.

Corruption and organizational malaise within the PLA can erode trust between junior officers, soldiers and their superiors, many of whom obtained their positions through money, connections or hereditary privilege.

Complaints against superiors to disciplinary authorities often proved futile, with senior officers banding together to stifle investigations. To remedy this, the CCDI was placed directly under the CMC. As a result, senior officers remain constantly on edge, as their rise and fall is increasingly tied to their proximity to Xi and his confidants. Corruption investigations appear arbitrary and often result in the total downfall of an accused police officer, the confiscation of his family assets and the dismantling of his network of beneficiaries.

Consequences

Xi initiated senior command reforms in the APL in 2015-16aiming for structural stabilization within a decade. However, his plans were derailed by COVID-19, leaving the PLA in transition. In 2023, Xi purged the entire leadership of the PLA Rocket Force and in 2024, he dismantled the Strategic Support Force while pursuing his former commander, Ju Qiansheng. The ongoing investigations into Admirals Miao and Dong suggest that, even after 12 years of fighting corruption, Xi is unsure of either the PLA's structural reforms or its senior leadership.

Trust, the cornerstone of a combat-ready army, has become the most visible casualty and seems absent within the PLA. Endemic corruption and widespread distrust raise questions about the cohesion and reliability of the PLA. With this PLA deeply compromised, it remains unclear whether Xi could trigger active conflict in any region.

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Atul Kumaris a member of the Observer Research Foundation's Strategic Studies Program

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^[1] David Shambaugh (2002), Modernizing the Chinese army: progress, problems and prospects, Berkeley: University of California Press, p 196.

^[2] David Shambaugh (2002), Modernizing the Chinese army: progress, problems and prospects, Berkeley: University of California Press, pp 200-204.

^[3] James C. Mulvenon (2001), Soldiers of fortune, London: Routledge

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