Syrian rebel leader takes a page from Khomeini and Erdogan's playbook

When a strategy works, why change it? In the 24 hours following the capture of Damascus, Abu Muhammad Jawlani, the leader of the victorious Hayat Tahrir al-Sham group, feigned moderation. He promised Syrians there would be no reprisals against supporters of the old regime and said the Turkish-backed group envisioned a Syria where all Syrians, regardless of religion, could live in peace . He did not seek to deny his radical past. After all, Jawlani had a $10 million bounty on his head from the U.S. State Department because of his support of al-Qaeda. But after sweeping through Syria and ousting the equally odious Bashar al-Assad, he declared he had reformed. Many analysts and journalists believed him, and diplomats breathed a sigh of relief.

However, no one should be so optimistic. The playbook Jawlani uses in Syria has precedent both with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini during Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution and with Recep Tayyip Erdogan during his party's victory in the November 2002 Turkish elections.

On February 1, 1979, shortly after Mohammed Reza Shah fled Iran, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini received an enthusiastic welcome. Three million Iranians welcomed him at Tehran airport. Iranians and foreign diplomats criticized the Shah for his human rights abuses, but saw in Khomeini someone who sought a better, more progressive country. Richard Falk, a Princeton University professor influential in Jimmy Carter's administration, urged the White House in aNew York Timesopinion piece to embrace Khomeini. The portrayal of him as bigoted, reactionary and harboring gross prejudices certainly and fortunately seems false, Falk explained, adding: “His close advisors are uniformly composed of moderate and progressive individuals who share a remarkable concern for human rights.” Khomeini may have been a radical in the 1960s, opposed to women's rights and equality between Muslims and non-Muslims, but Carter wanted to hear about Khomeini's conversion. Even as Khomeini unleashed a reign of terror, the State Department embraced the new government. Many journalists have also done so. Steven Erlanger, a young journalist who would later becomeThe New York Times The chief diplomatic correspondent filed a dispatch just a day before the seizure of the American embassy, ​​saying that although the revolution was not over, the religious phase was coming to an end.

The reason for such confusion about Khomeini and his agenda was his own statements. While exiled in France during the year before the Islamic Revolution, he repeatedly told Western journalists and diplomats what they wanted to hear. My personal desires, my age and my health do not allow me to play a personal role in the direction of the country after the fall of the current system, he told the Associated Press on November 7, 1978. Nine days later , he declared:The GuardianI do not want to have power or government in my hands; I'm not interested in personal power. The same day, he told an Austrian television journalist: “I don't want to be the leader of the Islamic Republic; I don't want to have the government or power in my hands. I only guide people in choosing the system. Meanwhile, he told Reuters: “The foundation of our Islamic government is freedom of dialogue and will fight against any form of censorship. He later promised: “In the Islamic Republic, the rights of religious minorities are respected.

However, once Khomeini's power was assured, he adopted a different tone. Don't listen to those who talk about democracy, he told Iranian students in Qom on March 13, 1979: “They are all against Islam. We will break all the poisonous feathers of those who talk about nationalism, democracy, etc. Five months later, he addressed political dissent: “We must warn these intellectuals that if they do not stop their interference, they will be crushed,” he said. His activism grew with his power. Later that month, he spoke at the Fayzieah Madrasa in Qom. Those who attempt to bring corruption and destruction into our country in the name of democracy will be oppressed. They are worse than the Jews of Bani-Ghorizeh, and they must be hanged. What followed was a reign of terror that has not yet ended.

The same thing happened with the rise of Erdogan. Initially, U.S. officials were concerned about Erdogan's religious agenda. He was an acolyte of the Muslim Brotherhood who, while mayor of Istanbul, denigrated secularism. Thank God Almighty, I am a servant of Sharia (Islamic law), he said when he took office as mayor in 1994. The following year, he described himself as the imam of Istanbul. In 1997, Necmettin Erbakan, Erdogan's ousted mentor, became Turkey's first Islamist prime minister. He immediately began seeking to reorient Turkey's foreign policy away from the West and toward the Islamic world. It was in this context that Erdogan recited a poem declaring that mosques were his bayonets. After the Turkish military forced Erbakan to resign, it imprisoned Erdogan on charges of religious incitement.

When he returned to political power in November 2002 with an overwhelming majority in parliament, Erdogan went out of his way to assuage Western concerns. We are the guarantors of this (Turkish) secularism, he assured, and our leadership will clearly prove it. American diplomats affirmed Erdogan's conversion. Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, explained that Erdogan's party was a sort of Muslim version of the Christian Democratic Party, that is, it was not religious at all . Secretary of State Colin Powell praised Erdogan's democracy, and on June 27, 2004, President George W. Bush told reporters in Ankara: “I very much appreciate the example that your country has given on how to be a Muslim country and at the same time a Muslim country. country that embraces democracy, the rule of law and freedom.

Erdogan, like Khomeini, feigned pragmatism to give him time to consolidate his power. Earlier in his career, the Turkish leader explained: “Democracy is like a tram. You drive it until you get to your destination, then you get off. As Western officials adjusted their policies to wishful thinking about its tolerance and commitment to democracy, Turkey's murder rate of women increased by 1,400 percent, with Islamic conservatives believing they could commit crimes of honor with complete impunity. Erdogan reoriented Turkey's banking system toward Islamic finance, contacted Hamas, provided logistical support to the Islamic State, and repressed religious minorities. Today, Turkey is a sponsor of terrorism unless officially designated. It uses its military industries to support radical groups ranging from Somali militants to Pakistan-sponsored terrorists in Kashmir.

Return to Syria: while Jawlani preaches moderation to Western journalists, he sends a different message to Syrians. Jawlani declared the end of Assad's rule and victory for the rebels not from the presidential palace or parliament, but rather from the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, the site of Islam's first caliphate. The symbolism was clear. The same was true for the televised appeals from the Jawlanis fighters inviting them to continue their march towards Jerusalem and then Mecca. Meanwhile, Christians are fleeing in droves from Aleppo, Syria's second-largest city. They know well the Syrians behind Hayat Tahrir al-Sham's victorious victory and recognize that they are far less moderate than they claim.

Few will mourn the fall of the Assad regime, but an enemy of an enemy is not necessarily a friend. Jawlani might openly avoid ties to al-Qaeda, but his ideological leanings are clear. As Sunni militants consolidate their control, Syria could become an engine of increased instability. Israel can defend itself, but Jordan is vulnerable and already ripe for rebellion given King Abdullah II's close attention to his own population. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the terrorist leader behind the Sunni insurgency in Iraq, was not only Jordanian, but today he represented more the rule than the exception in the Kingdom's poorest neighborhoods. Saudi Arabia, for its part, remains sensitive to the Islamist reactions that Syrian militants can stir up, especially since conservative elements and left-behind youth are unhappy with Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman's openness to West and reforms.

It is ironic that while Americans and Europeans pride themselves on their enlightened diplomacy, Islamists so often take advantage of their gullibility. In Syria, Washington, Brussels and others could well make the same mistake for the third time.

Michael Rubin is director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, DC. The opinions expressed in the article above are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the opinions of Firstpost.