A diplomatic gambit India cannot ignore the first post

In constantly evolving geopolitics in South Asia, the interim management of Bangladesh sous Muhammad Yunus embarked on a daring diplomatic journey that raises eyebrows to New Delhi. Since he assumed the following power of the eviction of Sheikh Hasina in August 2024, Yunus has not lost time to report a recalibration of the Bangladesh foreign policy.

The recent high -level visit of Yunus in China in March 2025 Complete with the meetings with President Xi Jinping and arguments for Chinese investments a significant difference in the approach centered on India which defined Hasinas' mandate of 15 years. This decision, masked as pragmatic awareness for economic collaboration, bears deeper strategic nuances. Analysts consider him an effort calculated to take advantage of the growing influence of Chinas in the region to put pressure on India, a neighbor with whom relations have dropped since the release of Hasinas.

For India, this development is more than a slightly changing diplomat. Under the Hasina regime, New Delhi experienced a privileged relationship with Dhaka, supported by security cooperation, economic ties and a shared cultural heritage. The government of Hasinas was a reliable partner, repressing the groups of anti-Indian insurgents and aligning the India regional vision. The interim administration of Yunuss, however, seems determined to diversify its alliances, China emerging as a key actor.

This change occurs at a time when India is already struggling with the expansion of Chinas expanding in South Asia of the Chinese-Pakistani economic corridor with ports in charge of the debt of Sri Lankas. The prospect of Bangladesh, a nation sharing a 4,000 -kilometer border with India, paying towards Beijing is a strategic nightmare for New Delhi. Yunuss overtures in China, associated with his lukewarm commitment with India, suggests a deliberate attempt to reshape the regional dynamics of power.

A strategic change

The timing and the tenor of Yunuss visited in China in March 2025 speaks volumes about his intentions. Accompanied by infrastructure advisers, energy and sustainable development, Yunus launched Bangladesh as a manufacturing center for Chinese companies, a decision to draw from Beijing's economic power. It was not a simple commercial mission; It was a diplomatic declaration.

The reports indicate that Yunus has sought to deepen links in fields such as renewable energies and sealtsetters where China has a global lever effect. His participation in the Boao Forum for Asia and the acceptance of an honorary doctorate from the University of Beijing also underlines the symbolic weight of this awareness.

For decades, Bangladesh’s foreign policy has relied heavily on India, a relationship cemented by the support of New Delhis during the 1971 Liberation War and supported by economic and security partnerships. Under Hasina, Dhaka balanced his links with China but never at Fresh Indias.

Yunus, however, seems to trace a different course. His request for administration for a meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi remained unanswered, which prompted the sequence of China Visita which suggests a deliberate pivot. This change is not only a question of economy; It is a question of obtaining a lever effect. By putting to the height of China, Yunus indicates that Bangladesh has options beyond India, a message intended to force New Delhi to rethink its approach to the interim government.

This strategic recalibration is close to the backdrop of the India-Bangladesh tent links. The presence of Hasinas in India since his eviction, coupled with Dhakas requests for his extradition, fueled tensions. Yunuss's public criticism of India for not having engaged opposition parties during the Hasinas rule added to friction. In this context, his awareness in China can be read as a tactic attempt to remind India that Bangladesh can turn to rival power if his concerns are ignored.

Growing chinas and concerns about influence and india

The interest of Chinas for Bangladesh is hardly new, but Yunuss's leadership offers Beijing a new opportunity to deepen its foot in the India court. As the largest trading partner in Bangladesh, China has long provided infrastructure and military equipment in Dhaka. Projects like the Padma bridge and the power plants bear the Beijing footprint, which is part of its larger belt and road initiative (BRI) to surround India with economic dependencies. Yunuss Visit increased this relationship, with talks of an extended collaboration raising the spectrum of the Chinese naval presence in the bay of the Bengala region, India considers its strategic sphere.

For India, it is a red flag. The 2020 border confrontation with China in Ladakh underlined Beijing's desire to challenge in New Delhi militarily. Since then, India has had to face a two -forehead safety dilemma, China and its ally exercising pressure from the north and west.

A bangladesh more aligned with China adds a third dimension to this threat. Analysts warn that Chinese investments could result in a political influence, potentially transforming Dhaka into a proxy of Beijing's rivalry with India. The memory of the port of Sri Lankas Hambantota, sold to China after the default debt, will largely loom the ports of Bangladesh follow a similar path?

In addition, the diplomatic heat of Chinas to Yunus contrasts strongly with a prudent India position. Beijing called Yunus an old friend, a nod to his world stature as a winner of the Nobel Prize. This personal relationship could cement a long -term partnership, especially since Yunus seeks to stabilize his provisional rule in the midst of interior disorders and calls for early elections. For India, the challenges are high: a bangladesh deriving in Chinese orbit undermines regional leadership and the architecture of security in New Delhis, amplifying the deadly combo of Yunuss and Chinese opportunism.

A fatal combo

The Yunus-China axis is an important threat to India, not because it guarantees conflicts but because it moves regional balance at a time when New Delhi can afford to distract. The United States and China locked up in a world rivalry, India has positioned itself as a counterweight for Beijing through alliances like the Quad. However, a Bangladesh tilting to China undermines this narrative, depicting India as unable to manage its own district. This perception could weaken the credibility of the India on the world scene, just as it seeks a permanent seat of the United Nations Security Council.

New Delhi must respond with urgency and ingenuity. First, he should directly hire Yunus, offering economic incentive agreements and infrastructure to counter Chinese generosity. A Modi-Yunus summit, perhaps at the next bimstec meeting in Thailand, could reset the tone. Secondly, India must strengthen its cooperation in terms of security with Bangladesh, emphasizing shared threats such as terrorism to rebuild trust. Thirdly, New Delhi is expected to accelerate its own regional connectivity projects, such as the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Route, to go beyond the influence of the Chinas and the Road belt. Finally, India must rally the partners sharing the same ideas, Australia and USTO invest in Bangladesh, diluting the domination of Chinas.

Ignore Yunuss Gambit is not an option. His pivot in China is a pressure game, but it is also an opportunity for India to reaffirm his leadership. The alternativea Bangladesh attached to Beijingtheretens to unravel decades of strategic gains. In this game with high issues, India must act decisively to neutralize the deadly combo before it takes root.

Muhammad Yunuss expanding diplomatic relations with China is more than a footnote in South Asian politics A challenge to India regional domination. By taking advantage of the economic and strategic influence of Beijing, Yunus puts pressure on New Delhi to rethink his approach to Bangladesh. For India, the issues are high: a neighbor who is too aligned with China could compromise its national security, economic stability and global influence.

The Yunus-China combo is deadly not because it is invincible but because it exploits the india complacency. New Delhi must respond with a mixture of diplomacy, investment and resolve to recover his influence. In a region where power is increasingly disputed, India cannot afford to blink.

The author, columnist and research researcher, teaches journalism at the St. Xaviers College (autonomous), Kolkata. Its handle on x is @sayantan_GH. The views expressed in the above room are personal and only those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the points of view of the first points.