Erdogan's electoral blow will shape Trkiye's foreign policy

The recent local elections dealt a major blow to President Recep Tayyip Erdoan, marking his biggest electoral defeat to date. The loss was not just any setback; he saw the secular opposition CHP takes control of 35 cities(representing around 80% of Trkiye's GDP and more than 60% of its population), surpassing 24 for Erdoans' AK Party.

The election result raises the question of whether a seismic shift in domestic politics will alter Turkish foreign policy.

The elections were significantly influenced by the cost of living crisis.Inflation reached 68.5%and that of Trkiyehunger threshold now exceeds the weekly minimum wage of US$93. The budget deficit and the decline in foreign exchange reserves are causing new concerns. The country's economic fabric is closely linked to the West, in particular to the European Union, which remains Trkiye's main trading partner, absorbing 36% of its exports in 2023. The EU also leads foreign direct investment in Trkiye, representing 59% of investments over the last 20 years. Thus, modernizing the customs union to include services remains a priority. The election results also strengthened Mamolu, the mayor of Istanbul as a major competitorto Erdoan, making economic recovery even more crucial to maintaining his position.

In addition to continuing to promote Trkiye's economic interests, four recent developments shed light on Turkish foreign policy priorities for the foreseeable future.

The war in Ukraine underlined the geopolitical importance of Trkiye for the West. Immediately after the 2022 Russian offensive, Ankara invoked the provisions of the 1936 Montreux Convention prohibiting the passage of Russian warships through the Turkish straits.

The first is the new dynamic in relations with the United States and Egypt. The recent thaw in relations between Trkiye and the United States is highlighted by the conclusion of a deal to sell Trkiye more F-16 fighter jets and Ankara's approval of the membership of the Sweden to NATO. The completion of Erdoan's long-awaited visit to the White House in May indicated new momentum. However, the relationships betweenThe United States and the Kurdish separatist groups PKK and YPGThe Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) is classified as a terrorist organization by Western countries, including the United States, but Trkiye says the People's Protection Units (YPG), a Kurdish militant group based in Syria that attracts support from the United States, could prevent a complete reset. , is closely linked to the PKK.Trkiyes' aspirations to join the F-35 stealth aircraft program, its desire to seek relief from CAATSA Sanctionsand the ongoing controversy surrounding Trkiye's acquisition of advanced Russian air defense systemsThis also strains relations with the United States.

In February, Erdoan's first speech visit to Cairo Since 2012, this meeting with President Sissi has symbolized Trkiye's broader reconciliation efforts with the Middle East. Ankara's humanitarian role in Rafah, coupled with its potential to facilitate inter-Palestinian dialogue, brings Egypt and Trkiye closer together, despite their different stakes in the Libyan conflict and Eastern Mediterranean issues.

The second development concerns Trkiye's position on Ukraine, where she must continue her balancing act of being pro-Ukraine without positioning herself as anti-Russia.

The war in Ukraine underlined the geopolitical importance of Trkiye for the West. Immediately after the 2022 Russian offensive, Ankara invoked provisions of the Montreux Convention of 1936 banning the passage of Russian warships through the Turkish straits. Subsequently, his mediation of a grain deal between the fighters marked a diplomatic triumph. Ankara wants to maintain this role, supporting Ukraine with military equipment but refraining from aligning with Western sanctions against Russia, thereby preserving its deep trade and energy connections.

This balancing act shows how Ankara views the world, demonstrating its willingness to engage with all parties while maximizing its autonomy. Last month, Ankara hosted Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov and Ukrainian President Zelensky.

Third, eliminating the PKK/YPG remains a top priority for Ankara. In March, Trkiye and Iraq concluded a historic security agreement that resulted in the official ban on the PKK by Iraq. The agreement reinforces Trkiye's plan to expand a military campaign into northern Iraq aimed at establishing a 40 km security zone beyond its borders. Trkiye also aims to neutralize the PKK's influence on the advancement of the development road project, which Erdoan is promoting as an alternative to the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) initiative, supported by Israel and the United Arab Emirates, which bypasses both Turkiye and Iraq.

Erdoan's latest priority is outreach to the South. In February, Trkiye and Somalia signed an important agreement agreement granting Trkiye control of Somalia's maritime zones for the coming decade, positioning it as a key player in the Red Sea amid growing tensions between the United States and the Houthis in Yemen and the Israeli military offensive in Palestine . Somalia forms a central part of Trkiye’s growing footprint in Africa.