Desmond Shum explains how Xi Jinping defeated China's red aristocrats

TIT RED The aristocrats of modern communist China behave very similarly to the blue-blooded aristocrats of the Western world during medieval times. This elite group is distinguished by its hereditary bloodlines: it includes the descendants of the revolutionaries who fought alongside Mao Zedong and the children of those who led China after the Communist takeover in 1949. Due to their high social status, these red aristocrats, sometimes called princes, enjoyed privileges. access and influence in all aspects of Chinese society. Awareness of their status can sometimes instill in them a feeling of noblesse oblige.

This is an extremely exclusive group and its archetype would be Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Communist Party of China (PCC) and the president of the country. As the son of Xi Zhongxun, a member of Mao's senior cadre, Mr. Xi was separated from normal society at birth: he was most likely born in the special ward of a Beijing hospital reserved for PCC aristocrats. He grew up in a closed compound reserved for senior party officials. He was admitted to Tsinghua University not because of his merits but because of who he was.

Mr. Xi began his political career as secretary to a head of the Central Military Commission, a highly selective position for someone who has yet to demonstrate talent and prowess. He was later trained by the Central Party Organization Department, again due to his lineage, and progressed steadily over the years. PCCs ranks. Power must be passed on to our children; otherwise, our graves will be dug up later, Chen Yun, a former vice premier, told Deng Xiaoping after the Tiananmen massacre in 1989. Mr. Xi enjoyed a fast-track bureaucratic career, earning promotions lasting two to three years. -three-year intervals over a 30-year period. For a normal comrade, a promotion every five years would be considered good fortune.

During Mr. Xi's rise to the PCCIn his role as ultimate leader, the Red Aristocrat's clan was his strongest base of support. However, the relationship became complicated after he came to power in 2012 and with his subsequent efforts to consolidate his control.

In the past, there had been a tacit sharing of power between the major red families. This allowed some to exert strong political influence over the provinces, others over major industries, and a few over both. For example, it was well understood within certain segments of Chinese society that Ye Jianying's family owned Guangdong, that Wang Zhen's family controlled Xinjiang, and that Li Peng's family had control over the oil industry. 'electric energy. This oligopolistic arrangement has brought astronomical financial profits to some families.

Mr. Xi understandably views other prominent families as potential threats to his dictatorial rule. Certainly, it can be argued that only the Red Clan, with their resources and bloodline rights, could mount a fight powerful enough to overthrow him.

In response, Mr. Xi dealt harshly with clan members who voiced opposition or criticism of him, including Bo Xilai, a former Politburo member and party secretary in Chongqing, whose political ambitions led to his imprisonment. ; and Ren Zhiqiang, the former director of a state-owned real estate company, whose public criticism of Mr. Xi, including calling him a naked clown, earned him an 18-year prison sentence. Mr. Xi also encouraged other Red aristocrats to step down from their leadership positions in the People's Liberation Army.

China has a long history of emperors pitting the bureaucrats of the peasantry against those of the hereditary aristocracy. Mr. Xi did not act any differently. To further strengthen his control and continue to loosen the Red aristocracy's long-term grip on political power, he constantly elevated bureaucrats from outside the Red lineages. PCCs functions of central power. This is evidenced by the composition of the seven-member Politburo Standing Committee, the party's highest governing body, no current member of which can be considered to come from a red aristocratic lineage. This has never happened before.

In addition to the loss of political prerogatives, the Red aristocrats have suffered significant economic losses under Mr. Xi's leadership. As China's largest wealth owners, the red aristocrats have shouldered a disproportionate share of the heavy losses suffered by Chinese stocks in recent years.

The wealth accumulated by the Red Families over the past decades, both on land and abroad, constitutes a significant part of their power. Offshore wealth is also their insurance policy if things don't go well in China. How Mr. Xi chooses to manage these riches and the extent to which he is willing to confiscate them in order to keep the clan compliant is therefore of paramount importance to the Red Aristocrats.

Wealth confiscation as a means of bringing down politically powerful or financially influential figures has been used throughout Chinese history, including by the PCC since coming to power in 1949. Mr. Xi has already targeted several red billionaires. A recent example is the fall of Wu Xiaohui, founder of Anbang Insurance Group and grandson of Deng Xiaoping. In 2018, he was sentenced to 18 years in prison and stripped of his entire stake in the company he founded.

Additionally, restrictions were placed on the creation of new wealth by the Red aristocrats. The last-minute cancellation of Alibaba Ant Group's IPO in 2020, for example, prevented many red families from monetizing their shares in the company. It was rumored that the order to cancel the IPO came from the highest levels.

The network of influence of the Red aristocrats, which extends through the bureaucracy, the armed forces and the business world, was woven during the seven decades following the creation of the state. PCC took control of China. They continue to enjoy exclusive privileges, including the right to participate in politically themed rallies, and remain a cohesive and influential group. But their grip on power was released by one of their own. After a decade of concentrated power through Mr Xi's anti-corruption movement, the clans are no longer strong enough to pose a serious political threat to him. Their peak is over.

Desmond Shum is the author of Red Roulette: An Insiders Story of Wealth, Power, Corruption and Vengeance in Todays China (2021).