Kazakhstan survives among the great powers

Most narratives surrounding Kazakhstan since its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 have either continued to place it under Russia's sphere of influence or, more recently, have put it under the reach of China, which , with the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, continued its expansion in Central Asia. Such a representation is, to a certain extent, understandable. Russia is a historically dominant power in Eurasia that remains very influential in contemporary times. It also shares deep cultural, historical and linguistic ties with Kazakhstan that date back centuries. On the other hand, China, the world's second largest economy, lies on Kazakhstan's eastern border. Let us not forget that Chinese President Xi Jinping originally announced what later became known as BRI during an official visit to the Central Asian country in September 2013.

In reality, since 1991, Kazakh leaders have adopted a nuanced strategy that avoids any domination by Moscow or Beijing. The core of this strategy is to establish mutually beneficial cooperation with countries other than Russia and China, even well beyond its immediate borders, in order to preserve its autonomy. So far, Kazakhstan has managed its geopolitical juggling quite well, dancing with China, waltzing with Russia and working well with the United States, the European Union, Turkey, Iran and others. other Central Asian States, among others.

The fact that Yang Jiechi, then Chinese Foreign Minister, put pressure on Astana (capital of Kazakhstan) in 2021 to deepen cooperation under the BRI framework and to better align Kazakhstan's Development Plan for 2025 and China's 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) suggest that Kazakhstan had not participated to the extent that Beijing wished in China's openings towards the west. On the other hand, Kazakhstan's refusal to join the expanding informal grouping of emerging economies including Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa and beyond (BRICS+) in 2023, a decision which would have frustrated Russia, underlines Astana's resistance to pressure. from the other end of its territory. Russia subsequent restriction of Kazakh agricultural imports, ostensibly citing security concerns, implies a retaliatory response. These events collectively illustrate Kazakhstan's determination to assert its sovereignty and avoid subordination to China or Russia. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev's 2021 essay, Independence Above All, has shamelessly reinforced this position.

A recent article analyzes Kazakhstan's ability to protect its independent foreign policy through its trade performance. Some interesting trends are worth highlighting. First, Kazakhstan's foreign trade has been growing, increasing steadily in recent years, while keeping the overall trade volume evenly distributed among many partners and not letting any single country dominate bilateral trade. As China became Kazakhstan first trading partner in 2023, a more even-handed reading of trade data from the past two decades shows that trade dependence on China has been relatively stable, both before and after the BRI. More concretely, the development of other trading partners such as Russia and the EU, other post-Soviet states, South Korea and Turkey has reduced Kazakhstan's dependence on China. Indeed, Russia and the European Union almost always share first place. As China's economy decelerates, it is unlikely to hold the top spot for an extended period. Given Kazakhstan's trade performance over the years, a more plausible scenario would be a future in which China, Russia and the EU share first place, with relatively small margins between them.

Second, in the years before the BRI announcement, trade between Kazakhstan and China was mainly focused on natural resources. However, it has since evolved towards a more balanced exchange, including intermediate goods, raw materials and consumer goods. Several reasons explain this development. On the one hand, at least in its early stages of development, Kazakhstan could offer relatively little to its trading partners (including China) beyond oil and gas. However, while creating competition for domestic producers of equivalent goods, the considerable influx of Chinese capital goods also opens opportunities for Kazakh companies to engage in other productive activities, ranging from reducing manufacturing costs improving product quality and developing more marketable product designs. There are also the Kazakhstanis emerging middle class. Market research indicates that half of Kazakhstan's population is under the age of twenty-nine and is open to quality products and brands from China and other foreign countries.

Third, and related to the previous point, Sino-Kazakh trade is both the cause and effect of an increasingly complex production network in Kazakhstan and the region. It would be naive to claim that Chinese companies have not captured critical parts of Kazakhstan’s supply chain and consumer market. Yet it is equally plausible that their arrival rejuvenated the local industrial system, leading to a widespread transformation of Kazakhstan's economy that can hardly be observed through commercial analysis alone. For example, the transnational rail transport of goods from China to Europe has played a crucial role in linking some Chinese cities such as Chongqing and Chengdu to destinations in Central Asia and Europe. This railway network helped catalyze commercial activities on Kazakh territory. One of the most direct impacts of such a rail freight project is the improvement of cold chain logistics in Kazakhstan, particularly important in facilitating sales of perishable goods such as animal skins, meat and cereals to China.

Overall, Kazakhstan's journey since gaining independence in 1991 reflects a carefully calibrated strategy aimed at safeguarding its sovereignty while confronting competing influences from major powers like China and Russia. Kazakhstan has skillfully balanced its historic ties with Russia and deepening economic engagement with China through its hedging foreign policy, particularly under the BRI. By diversifying its trade partnerships and fostering economic ties beyond its immediate neighbors, Kazakhstan has reduced its dependence on a single power, thereby strengthening its independence and economic growth. Despite ongoing challenges, Kazakhstan's efforts to develop domestic industries and diversify exports, particularly to China, highlight progress toward building a more resilient and self-sufficient economy, one that does not rely solely on oil and gas. Regional initiatives such as the CERF have further strengthened connectivity while driving national economic transformation. These strategies highlight Kazakhstan's commitment to preserving its sovereignty while leveraging its strategic location to establish balanced and mutually beneficial partnerships.

Linda Tjia is an associate professor at the City University of Hong Kong. Guanie Lim is an associate professor at the National Institute for Policy Studies of Japan.