Comment: China unable to take Taiwan by force

BEIJING: The situation in the Taiwan Strait seems to be on the verge of crisis since 2018.

Beijing has sent numerous sorties by military planes to conduct exercises near Taiwan and has frequently crossed the center line of the Taiwan Strait.

There are rumors that the mainland is considering seizing the outer islands of Taiwan, which suggests that it is increasingly keen to take Taiwan by force.

With the exception of missile drills in Taiwan’s first direct presidential election in 1996, Beijing has always been held back in its military intimidation, choosing to express its anger through rhetorical or symbolic sanctions.

WHY CHINA SEEMS MORE ASSERTIVE?

Its recent assertion is best explained by its status as a growing military power and its stronger expressions of motivation for reunification.

Improvements in amphibious warfare and anti-entry or area denial capabilities mean that the military balance tilts in the mainland’s favor over Taiwan and the United States.

With growing national strength, Chinese leaders believe that continuing to adopt more lenient policies as in the past may give the impression of weakness to both domestic and foreign audiences.

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Unlike his predecessors, Chinese President Xi Jinping has shown greater intensity in the desire for reunification.

The report of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2017 demonstrated this enthusiasm, announcing that the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation must be achieved by 2049, and that the reunification of China is a condition for it.

INTERNAL POLITICAL COST

But the continent is unlikely to intend to pursue reunification by force anytime soon.

One reason is that internal political risks are high if the use of force fails.

Victory is not yet an abandoned conclusion, having prepared for conflict with the mainland for decades, Taiwan has strengthened its ability to defend itself. The will of the Taiwanese is strong. The results show that 80% of Taiwanese are ready to defend the island by force.

In the context of the 20th Party Congress in 2022 in particular, Xi needs a stable internal political environment to ensure the extension of his term as CPC general secretary.

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Brinkmanship towards an incursion can jeopardize internal stability, provoke public discontent and elicit negative reactions that could sabotage its leadership.

OTHER OPTIONS REMAIN

There are still other options for reunification.

Some in China believe that the possibility of peaceful reunification has not yet been completely lost and that Taiwan can be drawn into reunification through the so-called Beiping model.

This model is based on the CCP’s 1949 negotiations with the Kuomintang garrison to take control of Beiping, now Beijing, without bloodshed, and it could be a profitable option to take the outer islands of Taiwan.

China runs the risk that, if it uses force, the United States could give Taiwan full military support, in which case China would end up paying an unpredictable cost to achieve its goal.

China is still the weaker party in power dynamics, and although the economic gap between the two is large, the military, technological and financial gaps are even larger.

INCURRING ANGRY US

Although some in the United States are hesitant on the question of Taiwan’s defense, the country is unlikely to abandon Taiwan, which would mean an embarrassing breach of security commitments and an unbearable loss of international leadership.

Professor Graham Allison once said that the United States and China are more likely to wage nuclear war on Taiwan than on any other location.

Even if they decide not to send troops to Taiwan, the United States and its allies can effectively isolate China economically, diplomatically, and militarily, just as China experienced from the 1950s to the 1970s.

Violation of norms against aggression and coercion by force would make China an outcast in the international community and prevent it from achieving its modernization goals by mid-century.

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STATUS QUO A STRATEGIC CHOICE

Beijing also has no practical excuse for using force.

Much weaker in military terms, Taiwan does not dare to declare its independence and can only maintain the status quo.

Meanwhile, the continent’s legal provisions are vague and can be interpreted flexibly.

Article 8 of the Anti-Secession Law states that the mainland may take non-peaceful measures if Taiwan were to secede from China in any name or by any means, or if a major event occurred that would result in secession. of Taiwan from China, or if the possibility of peaceful reunification is completely lost.

Besides an explicit declaration of independence, it’s unclear what actions this covers.

Is the diplomatic recognition of Taiwan by the United States a major event? And what are the criteria for losing the possibilities of peaceful reunification? In this ambiguity, the continent has leeway on when to launch an offensive.

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Given the limitations, reunification by force is still not an option for China and Beijing has no choice but to bide its time.

Force can only be seen as an option when China’s national power far exceeds that of the United States, the international community is limited in its collective motivation to back down, and there is greater certainty of winning physically. war and conserve the island.

In the meantime, the mainland will continue to use gray area tactics, which are a better alternative to a military strike, and to seek ways to subdue the island without a fight.

And perhaps at a future tipping point, Taiwan might consider accepting a Beiping-type model to avoid an imminent use of force by the mainland.

Cui Lei is a researcher at the Chinese Institute for International Studies,This comment first appeared on the East Asia Forum. Read it here.