How China's military is showing signs of trouble

The purge within China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) continues unabated. The latest news from Beijing mentions that Lin Xiangyan, the commander of the Eastern Theater Command, committed suicide. This theater command's area of ​​responsibility includes East China, the East China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait. He was responsible for leading operations against Taiwan once Chinese President Xi Jinping made a decision. No reason for his suicide has been given, although it is believed he suspected he would be investigated for corruption.

According to reports, Miao Hua, a member of the PLA Central Military Commission and director of the political department, was suspended from duty on suspicion of serious discipline violations. Additionally, China's Defense Minister Dong Jun was investigated for corruption. He had met Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh on November 20, on the sidelines of the 11th ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting. Both were personally selected by Xi for their current assignments.

Dong, appointed defense minister in December last year, is the third consecutive defense minister to face such scrutiny. His predecessors, Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe, were both fired over similar allegations. Although the specific allegations against Dong remain unclear, his dismissal is part of a crackdown aimed at rooting out corruption within the PLA.

It appears that either corruption is endemic within the PLA or that it is just an excuse to remove those whom Xi considers disloyal to him or the party. Bribes, buying and selling of promotions have been common practices within the PLA for decades.

In December 2023, nine generals were ousted, including the commander of the PLA Strategic Support Force. A number of PLA Rocket Force commanders, as well as top executives of Chinese military-industrial state-owned enterprises, have been removed from their positions in recent times. Such a massive purge cannot be limited to corruption. It was initially assumed that the purge targeted members of Rocket Force. However, this now includes naval officials as well as state-owned companies, implying something more sinister.

If corruption is so prevalent in an institution where those at the top are expected to be models of honesty, it would be much more prevalent in all other spheres of governance in China. Moreover, corruption is not a new phenomenon in China. Surprisingly, Xi's efforts to root out corruption are focused around the PLA, largely ignoring other state departments.

There is also fierce competition within the PLA hierarchy for promotions to a few important positions in the organization, as well as its governing body, the CMC (Central Military Commission). This competition also leads those in line to falsely accuse their rivals, exploiting the denunciation system established by Xi, resulting in purges. Xi needs the loyalty of the PLA to ensure the survival of his communist model.

Thus, the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) has an army while China, as a nation, does not. Such is the fear within the CCP hierarchy that any threat to its power results in instant arrest and disappearance. The accusations of corruption are perhaps a pretext for a purge.

A 2015 report in “War on the Rocks” noted that corruption cases were pending against more than 4,000 officers with the rank of lieutenant colonel and above, including 82 generals. Most cases were financial. Many of those surveyed were also involved in recruitment. Currently, they are the best.

Historically, all autocratic leaders fear being overthrown by a coup; many were as well. Therefore, employ every trick possible to keep any force capable of ousting them from power in check, including appointing their fiercest loyalists to the highest positions. In China, it is the PLA which has this capacity, hence frequent purges, some even based on rumors. The fact that Xi fired many of his protégés indicates paranoia within the leadership or that his choices were wrong.

Xi's demand for loyalty and constant purges have led the PLA leadership to seek to be more politically correct than professional. This is further amplified by Xi insisting that his political thoughts are part of essential reading for all PLA members. This is of greater importance than professional military knowledge. Xi had mentioned at the CMC political work conference in June 2024: “The barrels of arms should always be in the hands of those who are loyal and reliable to the party.

CCP propaganda, aimed at projecting the Chinese model of governance and affirming the elimination of poverty, is also pushed within the PLA. Regular purges have begun to produce military leaders with limited experience who spend as much time as possible showing party loyalty rather than working for the good of their subordinates or training their commands.

Added to this is the rapid expansion of the armed forces, mainly the navy and the air force. Reports from China indicate that the navy lacks experienced captains, as does the air force, and trained pilots. So these are untrained leaders leading untrained soldiers.

At the same time, the PLA is modernizing. It develops capabilities to meet future challenges. Information about most of their acquired capabilities comes from Chinese media networks. What remains unclear is whether these elements were actually absorbed into the force and tested in simulated combat exercises. In March this year, General He Weidong, the second-highest-ranking member of the CMC, called for a crackdown on the PLA's fake combat capabilities.

Xi rules through fear, cracks down at frequent intervals, and promotes those who are loyal over those who are professionally competent. For Xi, the PLA is more about ensuring that the Communist Party continues to rule China rather than preparing it to win wars. Thus, it adopts a strategy of forcing other nations to toe the Chinese line by displaying Chinese military power as formidable while avoiding direct conflict. He is aware that a major conflict might not benefit China, as the war between Russia and Ukraine showed. This is evident in China's strategy against Taiwan.

The fact that the PLA has not engaged in any major conflict since 1979 leaves many doubting its ability to fight a major war, especially when its hierarchy changes so frequently.

The author is a former Indian Army officer, strategic analyst and columnist. The opinions expressed in the article above are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the opinions of Firstpost.